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Abstract 
Expectations for what functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can offer 
psychophysiology vary greatly. Overreaching enthusiasm such as the idea that fMRI can 
reveal lies and political attitudes are as common as the opinion that fMRI, in its current 
form, is useless for the advancement of psychological theories. Errors in the inferences 
being drawn from fMRI data may be contributing to each of these extreme positions, so 
the present paper addresses these several common inferential errors and describes some 
of the potential of fMRI for psychophysiological theory and research.  
 
  fRMI and Psychological Phenomena  3 
Great Expectations:   
What Can fMRI Research Tell Us About Psychological Phenomena? 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a tool used by a growing 
number of scientists who seek to investigate the brain mechanisms underlying 
psychological phenomena (Cacioppo & Decety, in press). To determine the extent of this 
growth, we performed a literature search on the terms “fMRI” or “functional magnetic 
resonance imaging” on Medline, ISI, and PsycInfo. To provide a relevant point of 
comparison in these searches, we also performed a search on the terms 
“electroencephalography” and “EEG”.  The results are displayed in Figure 1. From this 
figure it is clear that the number of papers published in fMRI has increased steadily since 
systematic fMRI research began in 1991. As would be expected, there have been 
increases in the number of studies published using EEG, as well, but the rate of growth 
has been far greater for fMRI, especially in the psychological literature (see Figure 1, 
bottom panel). 
Why is fMRI becoming the measure of choice in psychological studies of brain 
activity? What can fMRI tell us about ongoing psychological processes? The rise in the 
use of fMRI techniques in psychological research, and the diversion of resources from 
traditional methodologies to fMRI, has led many to ask these questions. Different authors 
have come to widely different answers, ranging from a conviction that fMRI provides a 
veritable readout of mental contents to the equally extreme conviction that fMRI is a 
waste of time and resources in psychological science (see Page, 2006). In this paper, we 
attempt to place these extremes into a broader context with the aim of encouraging the 
effective use of fMRI to advance psychological theory and research. 
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Divergent Opinions on the Utility of fMRI for the Study of Psychological 
Phenomena 
There are several reasons for the increasing frequency of application of fMRI to 
psychological questions. First, there have been considerable advances in the fMRI 
technique during the last decade (e.g., improved spatial and temporal resolution, 
improved signal-to-noise ratio) that have made fMRI data more precise and reliable. 
Second, fMRI is noninvasive and relatively safe in contrast to some other neuroimaging 
tools such as positron emission tomography. Third, fMRI allows for the continuous 
collection of data, which is an advantage when tracking ongoing processes. Lastly, 
because verbal reports can be distorted and are difficult to collect effectively online (e.g., 
Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996), there is a strong demand for more objective measures 
of psychological processes. fMRI is appealing because it can be used to investigate 
psychological operations to which people have little or no verbal access. 
For some investigators, fMRI holds a special promise for the objective study of 
phenomena that people would not be willing or capable of providing in verbal reports 
(e.g., lies and deception, repression, nonconscious information processing operations), 
leading thus to the overly optimistic opinion that fMRI can be used to simply read 
people’s knowledge, beliefs, intentions, and political attitudes. While these phenomena 
can certainly be informed by fMRI data, the opinion that fMRI provides a readout of 
mental contents is overly optimistic because it is based on the denial that other antecedent 
conditions exist for the observed pattern of brain activation.  
Iacoboni, Freedman, and Kaplan (2007), for example, used fMRI to infer 
political attitudes from changes arising during the presentation of pictures and video 
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excerpts of presidential candidates. Iacoboni and colleagues reported that people who had 
rated Hillary Clinton unfavorably displayed increased activity in the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) upon viewing pictures and videos of Hillary Clinton. The authors attributed 
this activity to “battling unacknowledged impulses,” given that the ACC had been 
associated with conflict monitoring and response conflict in earlier studies (see Bush, 
Luu, & Posner, 2000, for an overview). They also interpreted differences in activity in the 
amygdala and the insula as indexing anxiety and disgust for political parties, respectively.   
Research on lie detection represents another context in which fMRI data have 
been interpreted as a read-out of mental processes. Spence and collaborators (2008) 
studied a single patient suffering from Munchhausen’s syndrome who had been accused 
of poisoning her child. In an MRI scanner, the patient was told to respond in two different 
ways to questions about the alleged poisoning, expressing either her innocence 
(consistent with her own version of events) or her guilt (consistent with the accuser’s 
version of events). Spence et al. observed greater activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex (vlPFC) and the ACC when the patient expressed guilt than when she expressed 
innocence. Based on the assumption that deception incurs a cognitive processing cost, 
this differential brain activity was interpreted as being “consistent with (though they [the 
data] do not prove) the thesis that she [the patient] is telling the truth when she denies 
having harmed the child in her care” (p. 312).  
Both the Iacoboni et al. (2007) and the Spence et al. (2008) interpretations may 
be consistent with their observations but there are alternative interpretations that are also 
plausible. For instance, increased activity in the amygdala and in the insula has been 
linked to various aversive states besides anxiety or disgust (and even to appetitive states; 
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see Feldman Barrett & Wager, 2006, for an overview), and increased activity in the ACC 
is not limited to conflict much less to conflict between unacknowledged impulses (Bush 
et al., 2000). Thus, the interpretation of the fMRI data offered by Iacoboni et al. (2007) is 
but one of several that are plausible. Similarly, the fMRI data reported by Spence et al. 
(2008) is just as consistent with the examinee being guilty as with the examinee being 
innocent. As Spence and colleagues acknowledged, as a result of repeated questioning on 
prior occasions, it is conceivable that the examinee’s own version of the events were so 
well-rehearsed as to have automatic components. The endorsement of the accuser’s 
version of the events, even if true, was not as rehearsed a response and may have 
engendered conflict. Moreover, admission of a culturally reprehensible behavior such as 
harming one’s child may trigger strong control processes in an attempt to avoid detection. 
The inference that regional brain activation indexes a specific psychological 
state without considering the possibility that other antecedent conditions produce the 
same regional brain activation is an example of affirming the consequent. Inferential 
errors of this type are not unique to fMRI research (Cacioppo & Tassinary, 1990), of 
course, but the high cost of fMRI research and the concomitant reduction in resources 
available to support more traditional forms of behavioral research have led some 
researchers to be skeptical of using fMRI as a tool for the study of psychological 
phenomena.  
One criticism of fMRI comes from researchers who see current fMRI research 
as being limited to localization of function, which alone would not help to advance 
psychological theory (e.g., Coltheart, 2006a,b). They argue that brain imaging data do not 
further scientific theory because they are often simply interpreted in line with prior 
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psychological theories. This sentiment is clearly expressed by Kihlstrom (2006) who 
claims that “There does not appear to be any instance where neuroscientific findings have 
constrained social-psychological theory…To the contrary, it appears that precisely the 
reverse is true: psychological theory constrains the interpretation of neuropsychological 
and neuroscientific data” (p.16). A similar argument was made by Coltheart (2006b), 
who states, that “no functional neuroimaging research to date has yielded data that can be 
used to distinguish between competing psychological theories” (p. 323). 
From the above, it is evident that fMRI research has elicited a variety of 
responses, ranging from exaggerated claims to complete skepticism. This divergence of 
opinions may ultimately contribute to a more realistic assessment of new scientific tools. 
Some of the same teething troubles were seen when somatovisceral methods were applied 
to psychological issues some decades ago (see Landis, 1930; Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Tassinary, 1989). On the one hand, physiological measures ranging from EEG, heart rate, 
and skin conductance to event-related brain potentials, impedance cardiography, and 
facial electromyography were embraced by many psychologists because they were seen 
as having less bias than traditional psychological measures. On the other hand, other 
researchers saw psychophysiology as a failure because the data did not support invariant 
inferences about ongoing psychological processes. Whereas enthusiasm ensures the 
application and continuing use of a scientific tool in a variety of scientific contexts, 
skepticism may help to reveal shortcomings and stimulate fundamental work to address 
these shortcomings. Many of these shortcomings revolve around a misunderstanding of 
which inferences are appropriate to draw from the data in light of the experimental design 
and the extant literature. We, therefore, focus here on inferential limitations and 
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possibilities in fMRI research.   
Reducing Errors in Inference 
Well defined theories allow for the use of hypothetico-deductive logic, which 
entails formulating hypotheses that can be falsified using fMRI data (Cacioppo, Berntson, 
& Nusbaum, 2008). The steps of this process are familiar: devising alternative 
hypotheses; devising an experiment with possible outcomes each of which could exclude 
one or more of the proposed hypotheses; conducting the experiment to obtain a clean 
result; and repeating the process in such a way as to refine the remaining hypotheses. 
Platt (1964) has argued that research based on hypothetico-deductive logic forms the 
basis for strong inferences and promotes scientific progress. 
When experiments do not follow hypothetico-deductive logic, Platt (1964) 
argued that scientific progress is slowed by experiments and interpretations that suffer 
from a confirmatory bias. If a theory posits that a specific brain response () causes a 
psychological event (), the manipulation of the psychological event and the observation 
of activation over the specified brain response may provide only limited support for the 
experimental hypothesis. Hempel (1945) referred to inferences of this form as the 
paradox of confirmation (also called Hempel’s Raven Paradox). According to this famous 
paradox, the statements ‘all ravens are black' and ‘all non-black things are non-ravens' are 
logically equivalent. The hypothesis that 'all ravens are black' would be directly 
corroborated by observations of only black ravens. However, based on the logical 
structure of the argument, the statement 'all non-black things are non-ravens' also 
corroborates the hypothesis; for instance, a statement such as 'this is a pink flower.’ 
Continuing to corroborate a hypothesis does not imply that there is not another better 
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explanation. Actively attempting to falsify a theorem by specifying situations where 
different theorems would suggest different outcomes minimizes this problem. 
An approach to this problem has been suggested (Cacioppo & Tassinary, 1990; 
Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1996). In cases in which one wishes to infer psychological 
events (ψ) based on a physiological event (Φ), one must know not only the rate at which 
ψ and Φ occur together (P (ψ, Φ)), but also the rate at which Φ occurs overall (P (Φ)). 
The appropriate measure of the probability of ψ given Φ is then P (ψ|Φ) = P (ψ, Φ)/P (Φ). 
Only if ψ systematically increases or decreases the likelihood of occurrence of Φ (or vice 
versa) can a real covariation of psychological and physiological events be assumed. 
Inferential problems can occur if interpretations are made assuming an 
invariant relationship between ψ and Φ. Cacioppo and Tassinary (1990) describe four 
psychophysiological relationships which vary in specificity and generality. Specificity 
refers to whether an element on one (e.g., the psychological) level relates to a single 
element or several elements on another (e.g., the physiological) level. Generality refers to 
whether the relationship is bound by context or generalizes across contexts. Invariant 
relationships are those, which meet the criteria for both specificity and generality, 
allowing for the inference that a change in Φ implies the change of ψ across contexts. For 
simplification, throughout the rest of the article, we will simply refer to many-to-one and 
many-to-many relationships (low specificity) as compared to one-to-one relationships 
(high specificity).   
Unless inferences are based on hypothetico-deductive logic, one cannot infer ψ 
from  without risking an inferential error when the type of relationship under 
investigation is not known. For instance, if a given brain area (Φ) shows a hemodynamic 
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response as a function of an experimentally manipulated emotional state (ψ), it does not 
logically follow that the activation in that brain area in another condition or study marks 
the occurrence of that emotional state. Unless a relationship between ψ and Φ can be 
determined to be one-to-one, at least within a specific measurement context, changes in 
activation in a given brain area or neural network following a certain psychological 
phenomenon do not allow for strong inferences that those same activations signal 
changes in the psychological phenomenon (Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1996). This is 
because the observed activations could arise from a number of quite distinct 
psychological phenomena. The following sections describe how research questions are 
informed by knowledge of psychophysiological relations and their corresponding 
inferences. 
Examples of Research Questions That Can Be Addressed By fMRI 
Contrasting Distinct Psychological Theories 
fMRI can be a useful tool for comparing psychological theories that predict the 
same behavioral outcomes, but differ in the hypothesized mechanism explaining the 
outcome (e.g., Dickhaut et al., 2003). Although it is always desirable to have prior 
knowledge of the psychophysiological relation under study, hypothetico-deductive logic, 
as outlined above, allows for falsification of one or more hypotheses even in the absence 
of prior knowledge regarding the specificity or generality of the relationship between ψ 
and Φ. Henson (2006a), for instance, used fMRI to compare single process or dual 
process theories of recognition memory. According to single process theories, items that 
are presented and later explicitly remembered (Remember) as compared to those that just 
seem familiar (Know) differ only in memory strength. Dual process theories, in contrast, 
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postulate that Remember and Know judgments are qualitatively different because they 
rely on two distinct memory processes. Henson (2006a), therefore, argued that any 
qualitative difference in fMRI data between Remember and Know judgments would 
favor dual process theories over single process theories. 
According to Henson (2006a), two important characteristics are required to 
infer qualitative differences between two experimental conditions from fMRI data. First, 
analogous to techniques used in lesion studies, there should be a significant interaction 
between the two conditions in at least two brain regions (crossover interaction), 
increasing the likelihood that the observed differences are qualitative rather than 
quantitative in nature. Additionally, for at least one of the experimental conditions, the 
two brain areas should both be activated or both be deactivated in comparison to a 
baseline condition. Otherwise, the crossover pattern could simply result from reciprocal 
connections between the two brain areas (i.e., the increase in the first region leads to a 
decrease in the second region or vice versa) and not reflect a true qualitative difference. 
Henson (2006a) observed such a true qualitative difference in his research on 
memory recognition, revealed by a crossover interaction between the experimental 
conditions (Remember versus Know) and brain activations. The posterior cingulate 
cortex was more strongly activated for Remember than Know judgments and the right 
lateral frontal cortex was more strongly activated for Know than Remember judgments. 
This result favors the idea of Remember and Know responses relying on distinct memory 
processes, thus supporting dual process theories (see also Henson, 2006b; for an 
alternative interpretation of the data, still favoring the existence of two different 
processes, see, Henson, Rugg, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000).  
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In many instances investigators have some prior knowledge of the 
psychophysiological relationship under investigation and have specific hypotheses about 
which brain regions are associated with a psychological process. De Lange et al. (2008), 
for example, contrasted different theories about how other people's action intentions are 
recognized. According to a first view, motor simulation is central to the understanding of 
third-person action intentions (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Motor simulation is believed 
to occur in the putative mirror neuron system, which spans regions in the premotor and 
parietal cortex. Neurons in these regions fire both when people perform an action and 
when they observe another person performing the same action. A second view postulates 
instead that other people's action intentions are inferred by mentalizing their desires and 
goals (Frith & Frith, 2003). The neural network linked to such mentalizing activities 
includes the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, the superior temporal 
cortex, and the temporoparietal junction. Finally, a third view sees motor simulation and 
mentalizing as complementary processes for the recognition of other people's intentions 
(Keysers & Gazzola, 2007), with the former being automatic and intuitive and the latter 
being more reflective in nature. Thus, hypothetico-deductive reasoning permitted a strong 
test of these hypotheses. 
De Lange et al. (2008) tested the predictions of the three theories by instructing 
participants to either judge the extent to which an actor's means of performing an 
action were unusual (e.g., coffee cup that is brought to the mouth is held in a power grip; 
no conscious processing of intentions) or the extent to which the actor's action intentions 
were unusual (e.g., coffee cup is brought to the ear; conscious processing of intentions). 
The authors found that, irrespective of whether or not intentions were processed 
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consciously, unusual intentions involved increased activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, a 
structure belonging to the mirror neuron system. In contrast, only conscious processing of 
the actor's intentions activated the medial prefrontal cortex, the posterior cingulate cortex, 
and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus, all of them being structures belonging to 
the mentalizing brain network. These observations, therefore, are inconsistent with 
predictions from the first two views.  
The described fMRI studies illustrate that theoretical tests based on 
hypothetico-deductive logic can and have been performed to distinguish between 
theories. What is more, these studies helped to evaluate competing theories in a way that 
would have been difficult, if not impossible, using behavioral measures alone. Not unique 
to fMRI research, studies designed to falsify one or more competing hypotheses only 
provide evidence for which of two theories better accounts for the obtained data. While 
the above studies provided evidence that falsified one or more specific theories, it is also 
possible that fMRI data do not allow for the rejection of either hypothesis or are 
consistent with both hypotheses. A researcher may therefore come up with an alternative 
theory and corresponding hypotheses, which are critically tested in subsequent studies, as 
suggested in the process of strong inference (cf. Henson, 2006a).  
Hypotheses Generation 
fMRI data have the potential to inform research questions by generating new 
hypotheses for psychological phenomena. New hypotheses about psychological 
phenomena can be formed when fMRI data violate expectations derived from behavioral 
data, provide data that extend behavioral observations and thus alter the understanding of 
a current theory, and even when fMRI studies fail to yield data that unambiguously favor 
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one theory over opposing psychological theories.   
An example demonstrating fMRI’s utility for hypothesis generation comes 
from a debate within research on visual short-term memory (VSTM). Behavioral data 
yielded ambiguous information about the number of objects that can be held in VSTM, 
which led to a debate about whether object representation in VSTM was limited to a 
fixed number or was affected by object complexity. Whereas some studies reported a 
fixed number of 4 objects could be stored in VSTM (Luck & Vogel, 1997), others 
suggested that the number of objects stored in VSTM decreases with increasing object 
complexity (n ≤ 4; Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004).   
In a series of four studies, Xu and Chun (2006) demonstrated that each theory 
was supported by fMRI data in specific regions of the parietal and occipital cortices. 
Activity in the inferior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) increased with increasing numbers of 
objects, reaching a plateau at set size 3 or 4, regardless of object complexity. This region 
also encoded the spatial location of the displayed objects. Activity in the superior IPS and 
the lateral occipital complex, in contrast, was influenced by object complexity. For 
simple objects, activity in these regions also reached a plateau at set size 3 or 4. With 
increasing complexity of the objects presented, however, the plateau was reached with 
smaller object set sizes already, proposing that the superior IPS and the lateral occipital 
complex encode object features instead of whole objects.  
These data permitted the generation of the hypothesis that VSTM capacity 
relies on two or more interacting psychological processes. The data suggest a first 
process, associated with activity in the inferior IPS, which encodes the spatial locations 
of the objects and determines which objects in the environment receive closer attention. 
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A second process, associated with activity in the superior IPS and the lateral occipital 
complex, then more deeply processes and encodes the objects that were preselected in the 
early stage. However, due to limited processing capacities, the number of complex 
objects that can receive closer inspection in the second stage is further reduced. This 
hypothesis helped explain inconsistent findings in the VSTM research and unified the 
two competing theories in a way that had proven difficult to achieve based on analyses of 
behavioral data alone. 
Hypotheses derived from fMRI research can, in this way, act as a starting point 
for subsequent systematic investigations of psychological phenomena and provide insight 
about the mechanisms underlying these phenomena. For instance, psychological 
theorizing can be further advanced by directly and reliably relating psychological 
processes to specific brain activations.  
Strategies That Increase the Interpretability of fMRI data 
As we have seen thus far, fMRI data can address questions about how neural 
activation might be related to certain mental states or behavior. However, inferences 
about a specific psychological process based on the activation of a particular brain region 
should be considered tentative given the current limited knowledge about the functions 
served by individual brain regions and the possibility of more than one psychological 
antecedent for the activation of a particular brain region. 
The possibility of many-to-many and many-to-one relationships makes it 
important to search for alternative, testable hypotheses that might fit the data (cf. 
Poldrack, 2006). A researcher therefore may want to decrease the possible number of 
alternative interpretations for specific brain activations when planning an experiment. 
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The following actions foster the accomplishment of this goal. 
1. Refinement of Psychological Concepts 
In some studies, possible interpretations of fMRI data can be limited by 
refining concepts on the psychological level (ψ). For example, interference in different 
versions of the Stroop task can be cognitive (color Stroop) or affective (emotional 
Stroop) in nature. Different subsections of the ACC have been linked to these cognitive 
and affective Stroop tasks (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000), and these differences on the 
psychological level have been shown to account for a considerable part of the spatial 
distribution of activations within the ACC in Stroop tasks. Breaking down psychological 
concepts in subcomponents, in this instance, increased the interpretability of brain data by 
equating these specific subcomponents with specific brain activations. 
2. Consideration of an Intervening Computational Level 
 Better inferences may also be obtained by considering the psychological concept 
under investigation within a computational framework. Inference is improved when 
psychological processes are decomposed into their constituent information processing 
operations, instead of assuming a one-to-one relationship between psychological concepts 
and neural responses. These basic information processing operations may be more easily 
related to activity in specific brain regions. Additionally, identification of information 
processing components allows for a better understanding of more complex psychological 
phenomena by elucidating when and how these neural processes are integrated.  
Such a strategy has been pursued in recent research on the visual system, which 
has demonstrated that decomposing psychological entities into simpler computational 
features can enhance the accuracy of inferences drawn from brain responses (Kay, 
  fRMI and Psychological Phenomena  17 
Naselaris, Prenger, & Gallant, 2008). The neural activity associated with processing of 
simple images was better understood by decomposing images into visual processing 
components such as space, orientation, and spatial frequency. In the study by Kay et al. 
(2008), participants looked at pictures while in an MRI scanner. From the acquired brain 
data, a qualitative receptive-field model was estimated for each voxel, accounting for 
space, orientation, and spatial frequency characteristics of the presented images. Based on 
this model, which defined psychological concepts by its related basic computational units 
in the visual system, the authors improved their ability to predict brain responses to a new 
set of pictures and were able to correctly identify which picture had been displayed in 
most cases (110 out of 120 pictures for a first participant; 86 out of 120 pictures for a 
second participant).  
3. Consideration of Smaller, Circumscribed, Brain Regions  
Another way to decrease errors of inference is by considering well-defined, 
circumscribed, brain regions instead of gross anatomical landmarks. Considering smaller 
regions where activation is particularly strongly associated with a specific psychological 
event may simultaneously reduce the probability of activation in the exact same region 
due to other psychological events. Because, as mentioned above, P(ψ|Φ) = P(ψ ,Φ)/P(Φ), 
choosing an area that has a strong relationship could increase P(ψ ,Φ), while excluding 
parts of the area that are associated with other mental processes simultaneously reduces 
P(Φ) by decreasing the probability P(Φ, not ψ) in the concerned region. Both effects 
should increase P (ψ|Φ), and thus the validity of an inference deriving mental processes 
from brain activities. 
For instance, Poldrack (2006) found that smaller brain regions allowed for 
  fRMI and Psychological Phenomena  18 
more valid inferences about language processing. A brain region is characterized by high 
selectivity if it is activated by the phenomenon of interest and only few or no other 
phenomena. High selectivity of a region, in turn, allows for stronger inferences. On the 
basis of the results of a representative study in the field (McDermott et al., 2003), 
Poldrack (2006) defined a region of interest (ROI) in the dorsal left inferior frontal gyrus 
that had been shown to be active during both phonological and semantic processing. To 
assess the ROI’s selectivity for language processing, Poldrack (2006) compared the 
number of language-related studies with the number of not language-related studies 
showing activity in this region. While the center for this ROI was comparable for 
different analyses, cluster width varied from 4 mm to 40 mm. The author demonstrated 
that smaller region sizes were characterized by greater selectivity (i.e., fewer errors of 
inference) than were larger region sizes.  
4. Consideration of neural networks instead of isolated brain areas 
Brain circuits rather than single brain regions may be a better marker of 
psychological phenomena or processes, especially when these phenomena or processes 
are complex. Poldrack (2008) posits that “to the degree that neuroimaging data are 
predictive of mental states, this prediction will come both from fine-grained patterns of 
activity (which are not evident to the human eye) and from the coordinated activity across 
many brain regions, not from localized activity in specific brain regions.”  
Using coordinated patterns of activity strengthens the association P(ψ, Φ) in much 
the same way that choosing small, distinct brain regions strengthens associations. 
Physiological responses to a given psychological phenomenon may share some of the 
same regions of brain activation with other psychological phenomena, but it is less likely 
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that the exact same pattern of activation will happen in the absence of the psychological 
phenomenon. P(Φ) is, therefore, reduced by reducing P(Φ, not ψ). Defining Φ as activity 
of a neural network instead of activity of an isolated brain area thus may increase the 
interpretability of the observed fMRI data.  
5. Testing fMRI Data for Homogeneity 
In efforts to increase the signal to noise ratio in fMRI studies, patterns of 
activation are often aggregated across trials and across individuals. For the results of 
aggregations to be informative, similar trials within a subject must be homogenous and 
individuals must also be homogenous on a particular trial type. The existence of 
heterogeneity within an individual or between individuals may lead to erroneous 
interpretations. For example, if the same behavioral outcome can result from different 
strategies, reflected by different brain activations, composite activation may be an 
average of the two or more different activation patterns. This can occur if a single person 
uses different strategies on different trials, if different individuals use different processing 
strategies, or if both of these types of heterogeneity are present. The aggregate pattern of 
activation that is obtained would reflect none of the individual patterns of activation 
accurately. In order to reduce problems of aggregation within individuals, tests of 
heterogeneity are typically conducted. Some examples include comparing activation 
patterns on even versus odd trials, or early trials versus later trials (e.g., McKeown et al., 
2002). Across individuals, such tests of heterogeneity are still relatively rare in fMRI 
studies (e.g., Kherif et al., 2003).  
The aggregate activation pattern, in cases of heterogeneity, reflects the average 
activation not the typical activation. In fact, in some cases, the aggregate activation 
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pattern may not be representative of any individual's pattern of activation. Inferring that 
the average activation pattern is the typical activation pattern can lead to spurious 
inference. One example of aggregate data not representing a typical pattern of activation 
is in lie detection. Monteleone et al. (in press) attempted to predict whether each 
individual in a group was lying from the aggregate activation of the group. They found 
that even though the group analysis showed greater activation in a number of regions 
when participants were lying, none of these regions predicted lying across all individuals.  
6. Experimentally Controlling for Alternative Antecedents and Use of Convergent 
Measures 
When planning a study, the researcher may want to control a priori for some 
alternative interpretations of expected brain activations. Controlling for alternative causes 
of brain activation can also reduce P(Φ, not ψ). This can be achieved by holding these 
alternative antecedents constant across experimental conditions. Additionally, selecting 
specific experimental tasks or participants may reduce the number of possible alternative 
explanations.  
Alternative explanations may also be controlled for through the use of 
convergent methods of data collection. For example, in research on conflict, registration 
of reaction times and eye tracking can be used to exclude visual attention as an 
alternative interpretation for obtained fMRI data. Likewise, a study of emotional state 
mirroring used facial EMG to exclude an alternative hypothesis that activity in premotor 
cortices reflected emotional expression rather than automatic preparatory responses 
(Warren et al., 2006).  Eye tracking or facial EMG used in other types of studies, 
however, might not provide information that can differentiate between theories. 
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Behavioral measures and fMRI therefore, act as complementary sources of information, 
but only improve inference when they are selected to provide information about 
hypotheses that could not be appropriately or easily tested with fMRI data or 
complementary methods alone.   
In sum, the increased use of fMRI research for the investigation of psychological 
questions has been a cause for both enthusiasm and skepticism. The aim of the present 
article is to draw a realistic picture of what psychophysiology currently offers to fMRI 
and may offer in the future by discussing problems in inference occasionally found in this 
area of research. An investigator’s aim may be to uncover one-to-one relationships 
between psychological phenomena or processes and activity in specific brain networks. If 
such invariant relationships are established, the number of potential antecedents is 
minimized and affirming the consequent would be correctly implicated by the results. 
However, this goal will perhaps be reached more quickly if investigators do not assume 
any invariant relationships but instead expect to have to marshal empirical evidence to 
support the claim.  
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Number of fMRI and EEG publications within the last 20 years as 
revealed by literature searches performed on Medline (top panel), ISI (middle panel), and 
PsycInfo (bottom panel).  
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